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l ~__-_~Jl1' ;s the polky of Carnell University tf<:tlvefy to support equo!ity
of edocaHo-ncd and employment" opportvntfy. N0 person shall be
denied admissIon to any e:duciOtkmo! program or activity or be
clenJiH:f ~m:p:l'oym~nt on theha~i5 of ~t)y ieg:tiHy ptohil,Hecl dJs-
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hondi,~a:p. The U~iYer$Hy is committed to the maintenance of
affirmative action programs which wiH Qssure fhe contirH.lction
of such equoHty of opportunity.pepartment,ofAgnpu:ltuta:I'Ecq:nomics
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_ > _, <' ~.~S: mtP~~ >de;~~lopS:"~:PQlitic_~~:eeoti~m¥:~~w:otk :that -d~tenninesthe;:factots
cau~ing .tlllderinvestment~ publicJese~c~-expendih:tte~. G(}vemments areunable to
fully compensate for unequal incom,e distributioneffects ofresearch becal,Jse ofeither
their inability tomake credible commitments orofdeadweightcosts associated with
compensation.und~nri\ie~imerit iff pubHe" 'res'i:~arch expenditures for agriculture' w~r1d-wide (Ruttan; , s~hultz;
:, ,.'Htifffuan' IDle! ;Evensoh)~ sevet£r expIM~tion~' have 'b~eri::ptit"forward in~ludini 'iin:perf~~{ i~fdrination
.',; (if"'goverriMents,' diffictlItliis 'itl: 'ov~cofuirig the: p~l~uiar nii-tUre of the ";'p~blicne~~' o~{ ~~~earch
"'(1htn§~cti~il" C6'st~t' "antt :fH~f rlder"pt(jbleins' ;'(spill~o~6rs an~spilt-i~' between' COU11trles or state:s
witwn.:3; t:o~nto/)~ OtheI:~ :have :¢~~~m¢d-:that unqeri.~~~~tm~nt m~y :b~: :over~~ed' '~~:g~rl~~':'~t~die:$
":';:<:ig~6f~:::;4~d~1ght 'Qri~~{~t¥~~ti~if-(F&x>~::::the' O()~iry's'tt~e,~~ition 'and:':t~rms dr::tr,ade e{fe.cts
(Bdw~mt~\lni{Ft~'~&imJ, ,the' i4iifete>~c~ :b~tweeli 'irt:t~fu{~dlaie ,iui({Ariis~~d 'pr~>~tci~)' :th~>eff~~ts :~~"
.... uh¢~ployitient(Schtrlitz ·iOJd·~eh ~;~ incre~~ in thed~~eight ~~ts ofeJtistingcommodi~
p~licies-'(MkphY, Furtan ~d Schmitz):'l' ,
" .. ,', Th1:S' :~aper' deve.Irips"a: priliti~'at econom:y' ttamewhrk th~t';dete~in~s the' poli~icat 'i~ctors
c'~using the' apparent uriderinves~ent 'in iiubilc resear~h ~xPenditures 'hi agncultUre. A key
c?~~i~i:~t~~~j~,die>W1e'lu:al i~~~me' d~stiib~t1?u etf~ts of' agticu1~ai r~se~ch'-bttw~~it, sectors -th~~,
leadsgO~e~~ritsto 'b~I~~~ :tbe '~~lidcal-'cost~ 'Md benefits'of :di~:e~gmg' frhn~reach' inter~sfgtoup~s
private optimum level of the public good investment. Each gJQuP may have a v~ry' different
opt:im~,for -pub1i~"research. rakj~g ,agr~~~lture ;as,~, e}\,am;ple, ,j.n¢:la~~i~ -'&~:p;1~d, ,~d,elastic supply
> , > v ",' , v < > • > • A ' > ~ ,(" < A / ~ v i ~ ~
,_, "i~ >i~~~$~~~ '~O:W1try ~g~ic~Hu:t:~ W~~-Xes:plt i~_ PQJ:)~p~,~r$, ·~~!t~~ti~~ t.~t~tiv~ly ~ore t1}~: f~fnl~r:g
(~de,e4, tq~,l~~~r:.:qan, eyen' lQse). This:inoom,e: ,~neq~~li~y ,g~erate~r J?y ~bljc"r¢~earQh wi:ll lead to
A A ~ ,A ~. i ~ , ~ " > ~ > " ~ _ • ~ >., - >. • > ,'- ~ - • A / ~ > < A i ~ > ~ ~ -
underinvestment, unless governments can fully compensate the group benefiting less. Full
compensation will generally be impossihle because ofeither the inability of governments to make
credible commitments orofdeadweight costs associated withthe compensation.
1 'The ~xc~lle~t su~ey in USDA (1995) also argues that studies may ignore private research, lags in the effects of
rese~ch.,and ~~e~tial :~nviron;menta1 and health effects.2
:Th~;;-'dYh~~C"::'e&et$ ()r::t~s~at~h- >011:'ifitome dt~trlhuth)n - atia>'th~ ':g~verirtn~)jcSattempt to
compensate through redistributive pol~'Y will inevitably lead to underinvesttnent.,." Jl1is i.~, ,h~9ause
~: ~~>_>~ > ~ > ~ ~~~~ >'-~'«'v
the government can1JQ/ cr:edfbly cOl!,lmit tofu# CfXf!!pe!JslJfi0rl.jor,u11-eqlfQl Jnl;o~e ceffec.t$-,ofresearch.
> ~~>~:>, .'.~ >',: -';.;, .>:' .:._ > v~ ~ .=: ~< > -:~:~ : :-: ,~:~: ~ > ~ - ,'> > N~ >: >':: :<: ~A_< .' v,< ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -.~ '~. >. >v ~ /~.~ .~.> >-'.;
This inability of,cUlJ"ynt gove~~nts to credib~y' c~mmit to compeps:atiQn,in fu~ future ,(when the
~ ~> ~ >~: ~_~> IA ~.',. Y >. ,'_- > <~ ~:,' >~ ,v - y v,, > .,.'>~. >~»> vV'l >v ~.» ~> >.~ r' - ~ ,~>
" unequal 4~stribution:¥ .effects of,:resear:ch ,e~erg:e), .o~~w-~ ~-y~~ .,if ><nQl1-4~~t9rtip~ary ,htmptsum
• > ; ~ / >A~~ A: "': ~»: :. > ,,:~: "~~, ~ :: ~A~" • : • < ' ~ ~ ~ " , A ~: ~~ • ~" ~~' ~~ , •• v"' (:' ~_'~ , I>,. /: ~ .' / ,~ , .,' ~ ~ .•• ,'~ ~ ~ .~ -' " : ~< ~.'<' ~, ~, ::, I' ~
tran~fersare av_a~lakle for.the re~istributiv~ policy. "l1trtial CQmpens~t~9n ~d th.-; resulting ;r~duction
,> .~~' ~~~: ~~~"';:~""l"~:~ ~ >,'. A""' . c~' , ~<>~' ~ ~ ."":. '·>'»v<>,:" ~<, ," ~ ",>~=(>: ~~: ". ;:.v~:<vv ~A."<: ,,_I
in political suppo~ <pr¢v~tit~. ~e .go"e~ent ~Qm ~h~~s,ipg the .~~~i'af .~pti1Jl~, l~vel ~f ,~~~~~ch
"vv,': ~ :~'~ '"~ > , ,~~' . ~ " ~, >~~' ~'~ -, , ~ " > ~< ~ ~ ~ ,< ~,' ~ _ ~ v ~..:
.,. 0
, • " '. '" ~~ A
'~ :: -tl1e"i~eYi~.~b1e e~r$t~;n~' ~f:d<e~4W~ig~~co~ts: ~~ i"~~$$t~~l~u~iy¢::p~liey a~i~Q.1,~~i~~~Y,:r:~sbJts ."
inp~ld~qm;;~~~.~;~if~~t'~~S~!}~d ~r~blY~@lID~tP~nS~~~ ;~;>~;~~Dll1¢··
.~e~:~iit~ ~¥~;;~S;;~h~~e~~~~~f~~~~~b~ti~tllJ~s>toun~~t ~.~S~~Ch.·
The paper is organized as follows. We first pr~sent ,a simple dynamic model with both
:" , ~ .A~, , ~ "< ~ ~ ~ . ' ~: ~ ~' ,, ,
r~s~arch,and redistri:b~t_iy~ ppl#~y ~ ~~dog~~,!us. After detertrPni~g th:~.-soqial op!it1(l.U,111 of a social
~ >,>,; A::"'>., ~ ~ ~,. ~ "-: ~" ., v, 'v',,<.' ~ \,'. ',' ~'. >~A,A./ ~~: :.; »»,' v <, .~; :, ~ : ~ >"v.,', ,": ~~:;- A .'.~' ~~ '<, .' ~ ~ .; > '.,' ~~ A," ~. ~~ / v, ~,
planner opti:~izing ~ two-perio~':~e~thamite w~lfa,re'funct~:~~,we ~e~elop apub:~ic c~~~ce mod~L In
, , , _ , ~ 0 .' ~ ~ ~"' ~ - • " , , ~ , : " A .' ~ A ~
comparing tJ:le :pplfti.ca~ 9P-~!11Jal. .p<?lici~s to, th~ sosia~ -9Ptim~~ ,we ~erive the p:Ql~~~~ ,factors
d~~~rib&ia~~~~t ~tri~~eto llli~nv~stm~ti~~gtiCuit~~~;~ar~~. .. .. . > .
, / ~ A"
""'The M(ldel
'»:ConSider'·an' :ec6rtorny'wi'th:tWd 'sectors:' agl1ctiItiire< (sector A) WltfindffstrY (sect6t 13):- AU
<" ~" <';in~iwduals -i# the: <:eton~~y 'ai{(~smned ,t()~ ,have irl:enijc~f:preferences~, ;th~ .saine tWo!"pei-roq: '-t~~







for individual I = A~B and time period T = 1,2. 3 is the discount factor, y: represents net income of
individual i at time t and U(y:) is the (indirect) utility i derived from y;. Each sector has one
, ~ ~ , l'
representative individual with a pre-policy endowment income ,y:, which" carinot· be transferred3
between-'periods. The =govel'l'urteftf; has,'<;hVo policy mstrUtn:ents -affecting --botl1':~the > level and
distribution ofincome infhe -ecdnomy~ publie" re-search investments tn',akiicultUte and redistribution
(through commodity policy or lump-sum transfers).
Define aggregate public research at time t expenditures by 't,. The cos~ ofraising taxes to
~ / ~ : ; ~ , ~
finance researc~_is shared equally betwe~n sectors and we, assume_no deadweight J;osts (or excess
~. v ~ ~v y. y ~> ~ • v ~ A ~ "'~Y,V /. '. ~ V;_ .y~_ Y > ~<>: v~ v ~ y : ~ ,. >::,' > :
burden) oftaxation. Benefits from research can only materia1i~in the)lext period (one period after
• > > A ~ ~ >_ '" '~ y v v V > ~ A /
the investment is made) and thereare no investments prior to period 1.
Rooi$trib4t~onof inC,ome between industrY> and agrictflhtre 'thrQl1gtI- 'pti~ :~HpPQrts,.e~p'ort
subsidies or trade bmTI~involve deadweight Cl}sts. DelIDte the redlstributivejOl~~ in period t ~
!, \_ ,.fl;1rl9~r '-r/(rj ) -isJhe ~$gr-eg~~ n;~t ~~~9~~> ~r:ansfe~ for;s¢ctgf i _ t¢s~~~in~:,from, p~l~-c.y }}~,' ~ith
r/'(Q) =-o.Ix~fine ~tA(rf).= r-, :~;:.r/(rJ)= -r, -c(r,), wh~rec() represents the 4~a~weig~tposts of
~~ > > > > >~ ~ :>~ , > ~ i', N _ ~~ 0 i ~ ~ > >~ > v < ~ ~ ~ _ v • _ ~. V A '~ ~> v. .',. ~ ~
the policy. Hence, policy rj repr~sents ~_e net tta~~fe:r tp, ~gri~uJ~~r~, A _positive r, Uleans
> > > _ / ./ ~ > v ~. ,v
agriculture is subsidized by industry as is so commonly observed in industrial countries.
Furthermore, assume that ae Iar 1 > 0for rr > 0, 0e / or, < 0 for rr <0,a2C / ar/ > 0 and oe lor,(0)
=0.
Sector-its net income in period t can be summarized by:
where the second term in the right-hand side r.epresents the impact ofresearch on its income in the
- ,.
previous period. Income generated by public research is defined by the research production function
f(.). Each' sect~-r's sh~e of the benefits derived from 'public 'r6s~arbh->is-represented by ~ i, with
'> ~A:+ f)'B' = 1.2-' ' Bec~uSe-ea~b- Pblic:y' h~as:;il differeniiaI~ itnpact 'on the distribution'-of lr1cofu:e', one
.group's Private -~pti~~ 8{ th~ ptlb1i~ 'good' diffe~s fro~: :'tlie other group. The ·optimal policy
cottibhi~t16n ~il1 depirici on-'the' 6bj~6ttve: -fun~tfo~' ~f :the g~~ernment :~d 'fhe -c~-~siralrit'~ i~~l~g it.
2 DeGorter and Zilbermall show that -the:-relative values of ~i (one o-fWhich'can be negatlve) ~pend on the elasticity of
supply and demand and ()hthe effects ofresearch on agiiculturefs- cost structure. -Fol' example~ a large cost reduction in
agriculture due to research >with an melastic demand could have-cOfisumets benefiting rtrote:th-ari farmers,:4
l~,th;is :p~p~r!<,Y{e ,~,:~~~>~~ t\V;9,,:~1~~~~#ve,<~odel-s:, one, i~ tlJ~ ,~itiQ"~1 $~cial pl~er. mQd,cl- :~d the
Qth~r, i~ ba$ed Qn:~,pub~tc ,~h~ic~,.f()rm,"latiQ», Q;f::g(}V~mm:e;nt ,~~~~v.iQr. 3 ,'" .',:':
• ~ ~ > '/~ > ~ ~ > < ~ ,.»~ _~~ ~ ~ > ~ \. ~A ~ > > > > > ~ _ A ~ ., ~ > ~ ~ _ , A A >
TheSocial Optimum
..
.' The 'optimal policies f'or a social planner are determIned by maximizing a Benthamite utility
»~. ~~ > ~>~ A~i ~':~,.~
'function. Wie:assume thai 'the sOCl'al'planner'can'use lump'-sum trahsfers to redistribute in'come~ and
"" We d~fitie thttpoticie~'tt: m ,t ~"r:tn t'JriT'iliafs61~ith1;s ptohlefu;:1fthe'socia!'optiii1al PQli:cy>s~i. , .,"'; ,",',' , ' ,1' ,2 ,. t ' :z" > ,', > " ' , , , " " ' .. ,
'OptitnaI researcti tnvestih~tit in the' second p'el'iod is Z-el-O (t
2
ni~"(})'because no' ~h)'UP 'benefits: The
conditidns'thatdetermine'the 'other s6chiroptimal policies are::
:[5]
[6]
wl!ere V'I.' ·~U·'f I J::I ::j 'Tfi , a·v· I / 6 'd' "J, ~f / -::I
,JY =0: I I>U!" ~ h =, <, ~ y't.1 ~~ .' ~ ~'U , u':.
~on4J,tio~, I4] impl~:es,that 'i
m =, 0 ~9 that rt = [(~.~ ~P ~:)f (t1)]/2. J:~~s" ~eansthe s.ocial
~ > ~ ~ > > , ~ ~ ~~>_ > > > A A__ ~ A
optimum ~n:, h~ve" Ml "~~tp~~~at~p~,,,with- }m,~q~l.: "dj$~~¥l:tiPga:l ~ffeet$ of,: research:
~AN ~/ ~ ,,~ __,•• ~~~ >/~> _/>~ o~~. ~ >.~ ~~»~,.~~ > ~~ __','__ ~~ ~ >~', ~~~'~ > > >~ > > ~ >. ~~>~» ~~. >
y:(rr),~ y,r~rzm). W'e ~~t!me ~~re ,that tQ7 ,soc~al pl~er can use l~mp; ~um (non ~ist~~ionary)
3 Throughout tb,~",p:aper w,~ assume,~t,en~o!tY,ment m~9I)1eS(lfe equatpet;weep agri~ll:lt;ur(t,~d industry. Dr-opping this
a$st$p~ion,c:oQ1piicates,th¢ analySis", ~,"botl1.opti~arrecl~striputiQn and rese~ptL investment are now ,a{f~f;~>:both by
endowment fu~ome differences"and, by reqjstril)l~tiQnal effects, of'research, inve~tlrientS (Swinnen and de Goner, J:995a).
However, this compli~atiOIi dOes' not chang~'the ~ain conclu~ions ofthIs' p~Per. ' , ,r:~s.e~clt investmentleveLis'between':the',preferred'inVeSt1':llent fewls"qf each :seet{)f. Dilly in the
spe¢ial :c~e-,where, both s~~tors,benet1t equaHyJromres¢arch.( ~ ~, =: 'f3:~):will each 'group~:s,}jreferred
investment leveLcoiDcid~':withthe,sbcial.optimum{using:.[4J, [5] and ,[6]:): "
The Political Optimum
A burgeoriifig'literature mpolitical ecotibffly speCifies'a'government maxitnizirig' sonie form
of ~ p6H4:c~fohJ~~~iyi:~~tib~ d1nl~ah; Alesiria' ai1d :;ROOrl:k~:,:Petrscn ~a taf1ellin{~::~~usset): We
eltleoo.th¢.basic ~WDsiiir\ pJiblicch9iFt' rnildel \}f SwinnertanddeGm'ier (199~) by includi~ an
endogencius 'Pl;l\)lic ies~t;ttch inV~l~ttti~rif in/'additipl1:'to:''lli~( :~edis:tcibritive"':policy~4 .The po:~jt:fca1
support politicians receive from citizens depends on ho~each policy affe.cts th~ economic welfare of
individuals in each group. Citizens increase their polItical ~u{':port.if they benefit: from the policies
and reduce support otherwise. Fottnally, individual political support ~t time t, S:, is assumed to be a
strictly concave and increasing function:ofth:e policy ind~ce:d ch~g~.inwelfare :
[ "~OJ , Sf S·i:ru'l( ) Vi(O fl)J' '0 .. 1 =,' .. l:Y' ,r
1/t '/.;...- ·.,u
The functions S'(.), U i(.) , and therefore V'(.), are contil1:QQUS, at :least,'twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. An important advantage ofthIs specification
is: ,1h~t it avoids ,indeterminacy,and m~ltipl:~"equilibtiutp. problems which.\~e,typip~I ~f,4eterministic
" ~ " ~ ~ > ',>~ < ' ~ ~ > - ~ " > > ~>
(0:-1) votingmodels (Mu<Hler; Coughlin) andofmultiplepolicy problems (Mayer and Riezman).
In order to stay in power, politicians need to obtain a minimum level of political support.
This depends critically on poUtic~l institutions that determine the rules of the game for political
decision-making. Under autocratic political institutions, such as dictatorships~political support from
a large part ofthe constituency may not be needed to stay in power. In general~ a more democratic
society has more ~ompetitio11;betw~n politician~.,resulting in politicians giving consideration to the
4 For an applieation ofthis model in analyzing.redistributivepolicies 6nly in agriculture, see-S:wlIinen (1994).Sl~" '0\ *): :rJ~~·O·)·*)(1+'Cr Crt *»
-
" Slf.(rf*) Ui~{1Y~) >,' <
Sj~(-r I *) ':UJ~'(~ J"*j'~2B uty'(t >1~Sp BIT (-r I *)
Sl~(t 1*) = ~< Ul~(t'~*j -'2&tj/~tt1 *'}~,A'f~«t:l *}
[11J
[12]
[9] max s/ (rr ,tt)+St
B(rp'tJ.
{:1.;,1"I}
5 'fn'~~ahty:'the:iwri pofidies: ~~y be deCided b~:different' parts (e.~>. adminJs~tions) otilie·~ovemment. t~ capture the
essence of these features~ we assume that agents have perfect information on irtcetltivcs, costs and benefits. Even if
different institutions are involved in the decision~making~ those institutions do l1Qt act independently,of one·another as
they take'each others-,actions interaccount. OUf:sp.edfieation.is-a's.implifi¢d way ofmodeling.this.
.[10]
The pol~,Oi~s :r;; aJJ:.d;,t; tl1~t s,~~v~ ~his pr~j~l~ ~e ~eP9Utieal ~P:tim~ .PQlicie:~ 5 ~ " >
~ _. ~ i ~ ~
,. < ': :'" >,' ::>:A;$}~)~~:::9~~~:far.>tIJ~::~:QCi~l ,pl~t~: '~~r~:;ate ,n~:,ir~¢~tiY~~:J~t:;the::s~y~~~*~· '~~ i~y;est :i~
'researchin,penoil2" 11> ~,:;:: o,t~ tift}~ .: < , :':::,,::,,:. ::' :" ':',;'':':' :::: ", ;:?,.; <' ':>',:';, :,:,1: >:: .'',"
,,>
Qons.der(~~~ IDe: 'QptirtIality:eondi-tiq~,sJn ,p¢rioQ··l ::
~ ~ ::'~ _ ( >~> > ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~. • _ ~ _ > _ ~ ~., > ~ • ~ A ~~ "
··imp~t on·':poUtica! support·':ftorn :tn'€!r: constituency;<Under" :peifecf:;c(;)mpetition, politi~i&1's ·will
ch{)ose:fue'p411icy ,combiri~tion :{ rt·:~,[.j.} 'that: :maX~mizes p:Olitical :suppbrt In: order'to.stay ·1n'power.7
< Distributiolt,Df;R~searck B~De,fits ',:
,',', " '" The political:optimMpoJ;icies\villdepen,t:C:riticallyoft the distribution ofresearch benefits.
, . ~ . A.~ ~ ..~. ~
"
Propositi&~'1: Ifthe distribution oi ;~se(lrch b~nefits is equal (~A :::: ~ JJ), then support maximizing
governments will choose the social optimal research investment (r:;:= 't ~')! independent of
credibility constraints ordeadweight costs.
~er,e :is, no ,~ntreJlt~ve-,f~r<:th~:"~Q,::~mm~t;)t,'-t0:'x~di$td~ute' lncQUles ,:(r-~,~'all,:~~t,'e~b::s~~tor
slw:es',eqWdlyin,financing, the.,pliblic gQod,inyestment ,~4 "lli~t pre-policy enuoWm¢nt i~~~mes ,are
> > > ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ > ~ • ~ ~ ~ ~ ~> > ~ / A > < > > A
,e,quat). "P~:~ate optb:tl:Utn ':}eve:I~'6tth~::pribn~::~-oclcotucide ,~i$:'~~:~::~~¢i~l' 9Pti~uW;. ,'
When re$~ar-ch 'benefits, are ,uneq,ually distributed between:»gro,ups (t~r example, when
industry, benefits',more from research than.agriculture beeause'of declining food"prices, induced by
eost.reducing r~$~arch), go.Y~~ent·~.;i~~r~~~',PQJiti~~l :$:1JPPQrt,by In,v:e~ti,ng ~t least, ,<is, ~uch as
v ',> _', ~ ~ ~ ~ > > / > ~ >. > ~ ~ ~ > ~ ',~ >
agriculture's preferred level (because both sectors support that). Furthermore, the government will
never invest more than industry's preferr~d level, because it would support'from 'bo;th'sedtors. Thus
,:~e POH~~~~l.QP~iintlrtV:i;;:::~Hl:~:~~~~~ ~~ph:,~eeto~'s,qPti~Uin. (a$::i-~l th.e so~.i~ 'pl~e~~s ?a$e)~ <
The ,Qptimum ,h~ where the rn~ginaI, ·in~re,~e in support, from industry is ,exactly Qff~et by the
- '.,» ~~~ ~ ..,._~ ~>~>._ 0 ~~ ~> >~ ~ v ~
m~ginal ~edue~~~n-~n a~ri~u~tut~~'s:,pQl~~~c:a~~ .$UPport~>~j1l;':1icat~d by, ~qnditi9n,,[11].
NotiQ~,., 1J9weY~t, th~t ,governments lJ~e: iJJ~()me transf~rs to, ,~ompen~~te, ~he s~cto~ that
,', ~~_>~ ~»>~ >~>~, ~.y•• , ,v__ y_'v ,~./ ~,,> ~~. />~ »~ ,',',>
;~,~eifits le~~, (q,r Jo~es) frOID, the. <publi:~ ggod i~~~stme~t. v\~~~" p:A ~-:f}/ , lD,arginal S~PP,Qrt ~evels,
~ ~:'.~~~~A> 0 A. ~ ~ ~ ~ > ~. ~ y~. • :». ~ - "V
V
,' _ ~. - ~ .- A - > >~ ~> ~ _. ' ~,> > • ~
wiU ,differ,l)etwee:n,:seetors for,th~"same <poli~y.. A grQup,'s-,roarginat suPPOt'l d~~~e~s,when this
~ " ~ > > • ~ ~ • > A. ~ >>.. r > > , ~. A Y > > ~ y
~~p, .h~e-:t1t$ ~ore, ,ff;91U"p{):li~ie$" ,and,; vice-v~r$a. ,He:ll~~" tye m¥:g~l1,~l $1;1Pl?0J;t 1:~v~l, wlll "i~crease
• > > ~,. '.> A ~ > ~~ / _ ~ > < ." , _ ,,> > > • >. > ~ >~~. • ~ A ••• ~ •• ' >
_for thO$~.Wh9 ar~ ,.bej;qg, ~~d ,tbJ:9~gh, ,reQis~ibu~ion~ Qr,/whep.. :tb~<, .i~v~~tm~-nt ,l~v.~L ~\7e(ges from
, v > _. / ~ > > '> _ ~ ~__A _. > __', ~~_ ~ _ _ ~ ~ < "> ~ > ~> '-- < " y' > ~ ,'_ ~~ > ~ • ~ A > .,. __
th~:r:op~imum~ The ,margin~l:'$Jitp:po:rt leve~~ '~~',en4log~IJ~us, in ~,pQlit~~ia!{s d~~~sion pr.~e~s-',and
> > >" - -'" , < " '>~ 'A·' ~ ',~ ~ - > > ~ ~ ~ ~ > • > ~ A > > ~ / > ~
will be affe;cted" by 3;11 pol~cies~ , C:o~~~ue~tly". as ~e ratio ()fmarginal P9~.~tic:al ,~p.pport ~~v:e~s adjust
w:ith c.ban~ing ~ve~tm~~ (i~ ~p~~itiq~J1IJ),jt,wil1-.also affeQt t4e ,Qptlrt;lal redistributlOl).~e~:~ls. In
this case, it would imply that S~! I S.l~ > 1 as a,griculture is benefi;tiqg less from r~s:e~ch thanindustry. Cond~~i{}n [10] implies that the govemrtlent transf~~$ ;:h1~pmelQ,agri:cu:ltQt~c,m" this: case
(rJ.$,.;>;:J»). ,';:1)is .~~s~t~Q~4s.,in general:, th~::p9li~j~~l. ,S9PP~t1:,:~~qb~j~m ·:~jtljg.411qe t~~ government
to compensate these¢to.r that benefits less from res~archby transfemng income tothis sector.
, ~:
Government Credibilj~ and Deadw~ight Costs
To illu~tehow government credibility affects the outcome, consider the equilibri~,}fthe
support m~Jn~Zin~ goverimlellt could credibly commit'to implement policies in the next period.
;'. The::con~i~bn::f~t;:·~x4naJ;:~edlsttibtltionirl':perigd'z;·<:rr';·=lJec()mitSr'-':<:>,:,:, ,,
·Prop()sitioll'2~ ,lj-support mdxbnizinggbvernmentscan credibly commit onfuture eo-mp-ensatitJn for
unequal distribution ofre~earehbenefits f:Il::ltiifcompensation doesnotinduce deadweight costs, then
fIfe p(ilj~iciiltY"dp~itizat~~seafch tn~~stJnent wllf.bi:the social'optim'um.' '" .. ,. .
;:' Jri';~e :atJ$eri~~ ofdeadwe~ght:-cost~r supp~t1,mi&imizing goV:~minents will' fUiJy comp~~~~te
for ..,arty unequal: distributional" effects of te~e~Eh::'beneffts in the' peneJ(l' 'they:', 'occur:
r;; ,=i -[P' A f(~:;') ~ ,~:B>j(~:;) 1/2~whi6h implies ~ar'pos~"p~Hcy inpotnes'are -equal:' 'yt(r;') :;:; y:(r;).
It IS inipQrthht' thaf :,~ls future :co~pensatitl,n' is ,guaraliteed. 'tb~cause 'we have >a~sumed that
g6vemments:::~:ait credibly ~b,tiiliiit to ':~tUte. pQ;ncies)~ils',it alIbws-'the govehmient' to ~hQosb' the
so~ial:'(jptimarteseatclf investment in:petlod I: <ii' ~'it ~ BY'tra:rtsfemng:mcome 'from ';lndustry to
. agricUlfui~::<tb ;,e6mpenSit~{tor,th(i uneqtial -benefits''of.re·seatth: 'lnitiiskyts' supp6r(:f6t~itlcteased
reseatcll d~cljfies'thcicau~ :irid~sttY':&~~; iri~t)llj6ra~s"the':p8Ilii~af1:y' in=diIcea"coriipertsad8r{:payments
'iH its"'aSse~smerif 't1r::rie(bhaiii~~rin -'lnbcime:"-' 'Sithil~ly~ : the'';:6ppr;~ttt(ffi of ~crilffir~rti)':;incrbasiI1g
reseaTth''inve~ent decreases as'comperrsation payments increase~ "'Irt" terms ~lcdtiditinn' [111, this
'imp-,nes that SA I Sf}, adiusts so that SA.,.:=:: sE. "afth-e'politieal eq'UiHbriuffi' resulting' in:equal'in~omes ll> 11' ~ - - 11" It· ~
and the soci~f optiinal level ofthe"public -research investment.If the goveI'lltnent cannot credibly commit to fun co~p~nsation,,:in:,th<;>.:future~:·>,:theft the
outcome is characterized by conditions [10], [11], [12],. Notice that condition [12] implies that the
g~~~~ent i~ '~eri~d '2 i~ only con~~~'ned' with 'incom~\i:~fe~'hi' ~'~t' p~~~~d. Si~ce research
in~e'stin~nt~ h~v~>~eripi~~~ 'in th~' p~vious p~riod, thegove~ent"takes 't 1':as'given in ~~~ibd 2.
Therefore, the m~~supp~rtievels Win ~t ~ ;rl-fectedby 1:" but by 72 onl~' As a consequence,
ili~ g~vernJI1ent wit/only pilrlilltly" ~ompensaie agri~u1ture. 6 •. With negative imp3~ on income
ha;ing a 'larger impact ,~ Pdlit~~al" s~~Port than an equal n;cr~ase -in incQm,e~ the reduction in
.'. P6!i~iia§~6tt~fth¢ ~~d ttid~$tiy1<"1lli1e~~asi~glyoffs(;ttlieiii¢tellS~k palitkaIsupport by
"':;tib~iiff~i~t agri~~t~i"the > ~e'qui1:ib~i~ ,~H be reach~d:::"':b~r~I~' :'in9o~~§ a~': equal::'
y;,r;>< ~:(;:;). l'hefell$Qn why Mt~ens~ti6ii~ted With cf~di:ble~itltieiits ~·imu
> ~ ~ A < >
go'teriUri~ntS' int6~aHz~d>b6th',ptinhd>effetts'afid po:li~i~S -in their;:calctilati~ns:, Fot: tl1~,::fiist ~riod
government, second period income transfers are fully endogenous with credible commitments, but
not without them. Ful1 co~pensation will always result if inco~e, inequ~Hty:::is endog.etio'U-sly
induced (Swinnenand de Gorter~ 1995a).
~ > / ~
Econo~i~ agents in period.1 ftl-~ly unde~stand.the ip,~el1;tive~ ofthe gQv~rnm~nt i:u p~rj,o,~ 2.
iherefur~·.a$ a~l~ijittn:e.~sthat t~·\1\-ilI.oldy '.,,~ .• J\1rtiaIe(jllip~sation mperidd .2; ..
~ ~ ~<
agriculture's opposition to period 1 r~earch' investment beyond ifs preferred level wfn be higher.
A~ it e~~s~quenc~ Sj~ > Sl~: at' (1= ;~ r 1 == 0,): 'This'win induce the government t~'~~p'~nsat~partially
< ~ ~ /
in ~dvanc~ (t: > 0 with SJ~' > Sl~ ) but in equilibrium, it is stl11 the ,case that
S A I ., ,~ ) SB(. ...) 'h th.. ll, l\ .. > lit' d '" ~. -m Th ' l' h th' t "}"1 -Iv\'t1,r 1 > '1,,''t I,'I sue ",,at,rj ;>: V, 1;' 1 < t 1" an', :'2' <-r~ " "etesut IS t ,,~t' .- 'e gOYenlll~H~~, \\~-"
underinvest in research because the setto~ which benefits' less from research' is' "only partially
compensated and win oppose increases in research investments more than if there was full
compensation. In general:
Propnsition 3: /fsupporf,maximiiing glJvttnm~ittscannot credibly commit to future compehsation
for the unequal distribution ofresearch.benefits, then the politicallyoptima!research investment will
be les~ than the socialoptimum. ' , -,
6 Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993, have called this feature the "conservative" characteristic ofthe political model.10
[12] and [13]. that deadweight costs would increase the mm:~i~~ Qur~en on industry for
compensatin~ agriculture for, the latter's small;er share of research benefits. This will r~-duce
industry's political support even :more, for a given transfer ,to agriculture, and bring the optimal
.' :" _:' ,r',,·::,-, ',:',-" ;., - ~ : -,': ,,/ ;',' ., :'.. ,. < .:'" ,>. <> ,;:> . < ' : .. , »
tr~~fer r{ .clos~r to zero. As a consequence,,second period c01T.lp~nsationwill only be p~ial, even
j,f ,9r~di~~~, ,p,Qmm~tm:~p~$" 9:fm, pe ,W~d~,. J~y th~_ ,.g9Y:~~~p:t. .', Ag~ifl, t~is" ~e~~ts i~"fi!~~, P~r:i99,
~~ ~~ ~~A ~»~.. • ,._~ ~_~» /~
,c,~p¢~ktion_-:~d:iti ~' l0~~rres~arch- 'i:n.ve~tm~~t l~vei+ this e:ffe-ct occurs ¢ven ifthe _g~veAAtllent
~~:diblycO~itfuture~lici~s:!~ ge~e~-elusj;is:. .. ••.. ..•........• • •.. .
?~9P~~~~~(j:~:'~:~ 1j;c(:)mp~~l1t~Qrt.,fot' un-~guai rJi.-strifJ~tit1l1::(jfi(?:~e,4t~h' pi{nejiis 'ind~ce$ ,de(;ldw:~ight
costs, then thepolitically optimalrese,arch investment wlllbe less than the socialoptimum.
There is one more important element to this issue. Thus far, we -have::issumed that there is no
redu~ing resear~h wilr affect the:'agricultmal supply curve~d" therefore the deadweight costs of
'~arketinterventions,such as price ~upports, imp~ct~ariffs, etc., (Murpp:y, Furtan and Schmitz). This
, ,
effec~ will only occur inperiod 2. C?ndition [ll]'the~ bccome~:
,·.-uB(.r' *)~'::':~--UB.·. -(t'.- *\ ..--[,'I'lBf,-(t *):.....-c':] -- ly -- 1- ~(J 2yl J.., 1 t ''i:
Vl~('t 1*) - 28 q:y(J: t ~~'~ Afor ('r 1*)_
where c't := oc I En reflects the addItional (second period) effect.
The research investm.ent m-ay mcre:ase or de~rease the deadweight costs associated with the
tr~sfer (i.e.,ocI Or -> 0 -Of, (Jct&t <0)"Theeffect.depends,onhpw,research affects the.SU;P:r:Yly curve
~d'on the redistribut1~e p~Ii~y i~stiument (Swinn~~'~d 'de':Gorter, ~9~,5b). \\l1en--research induces
a parallel shift in the supply curve, oc I Ot < 0 for most policy instruments. In this case there is an.'
" -~>
11
additional benefit from research. The effect will mitigate the negative impact of deadweight costs
andwin bring the political optimum closer to the social optimum. This mitigating effect will depend
on the sizeofcc lOr. Simulations reported in Swinnen and de Gorter (1995b) show that it can bring
the political o-ptimum very close to the social optimum, but does not fully offset. When research
induces a pivot in the supply curve and very distortionary transfer policies are used (e.g., an export
subsidy)~ then the likelihood increases that OC / &t > 0. Deadweight costs increase, forcing an
increase inthe gap between the political and social optimumlevel ofresearch.
C~nelu<ti~JRe~afks
Tbis paper develo:ps :a public'choice model to s;how how goyemm~nts that face polit~eal
cOR$trair,.ts'diverge fro~ social optimal levels,ofl!esearch investmentS: in agricultUre. In our model,
underinvestment in research occurs even with perfect information~ and no transaction costs nOr
deadweight costs of redistributive policy. The key factor is that the benefits from agricultural
research are unequally distributed. This causes differential political reactions from each group in
,~society. Furthermore" the inability of government to commit to future actions leads to a time
ihC~n$isteh~y,problem. B,ecause of,gQvemmenes ,~ab:ility ;~q: hav~ 'credible co.trn~tits,:only
~ >~ > > .'. • 0
partial compensation will occur in response to the unequal benefits from research. The result is
und~nvestment inpublic research e~penditqre,s. D,eaoweight costs ofinc?me redistribution further
reduces compensation and induces a wider gap hetween social and political optimal investm,ent
levels. However, we indicate from previous'research that this g~p. may be reduced:if research causes
a decline inthe deadweight cost per unitoftransfer.> ~ i >
:~_. , >> ,> >
, .'.,'>. '
> ~ ~ ~
ro>ShOw~"'~A ~'~~ ~ >~';>'==t:'
,.:Wi$. ~~ == ~,B,~,;~o:~,~~~$Q~Jl~).,imp-!~~~,~ ~at r; =,0. ,This me~s,th~l yt(~)== y;(*),>whie.h,implies
~ : :~~~ "_ i A_~:~:~' ~ ~~ '" ,. ~» _ > ~>~,><. ~~- _'~. ~> _ > ~> ~,. ~ ~ ~ > ~ > - > .>~ ~ ~~i~'> .' >v~v. >~v
that U:v(*) = U:y(*) in [11]. Then, assume that 1] == 0, whichmakes UI~{~<~~~:~~~(~) ~n [11.J<which
in tU11i ·implies th.at Sl~(*) I Si~(*) :: 1. All this implies that condition [11J can be written'as
U::><J't.:) ~ ~L~;?l1; )h.{t,.;},>, Whi~h j~, ~,d~nu~~ ~Q :8Q~didon.J 7l and. th~s: ,implie;s t~~t t,; -~, ~<r· W,e
ci~IY 'n~~d-~Cl:~$I1QW.:furt;I1&, t~at ':I' ':iO is con~l~te#~:~ith :the' p~lith;al-eq~nhd~; 'tb:is'¢an be d~ne :by
'~',. >t'-': j' m ~ A 'f).$ -,~ .' o· ~ ,~: ':,": [lAJ L:eh' .. 0 QE"'})
S~LJ~t~tu IJlg:-::'t:'l =:r,t -1-.t p' =P."',, ~4':1; 2'=" InlO.,.~On~d:tl~n..v, ,~~in: ':~lVes. r1, ~ ". 0e:' ,_>
Proofofproposition 2.
Introducing 'lnJ!: 0, r,t = [(~ A - ~ 11)f('t ~) ]12 and t ~ in [l0], [11] and [13] shows that
{lim, r{','t ~} solve-the conditions for {rj*, r2 • , 't:} when c(r,) = C,(r l ) =-0. Q,.E.D.
Assume~ .c(r,):= c,(r,) = O. Define k,(r,):=U:(r[)/ U;(r() and Zr := S;;, / Sl~' From condition [12J,
we knpw. 'th~t at Y2 == 0,S:l' = S~, ,and thus ~2 =: 1. Further, Uiy < U~}! and k2<1 at 't I >.0 and
r 2 == 0 f~r .f) A < ..p- ~. With aZ2 /ar2 < 0 and 0 k~2 Iar2 > 0 , it follows tha~ r;> O. Hoy/ever, there
." ~'
- /"
is less th~ full compensation (y;(r;)> y:(ri*»)because zz(ri·)=k2(r2*)> 1, which' implies ~at
With imperfect
compensation in the sec{}ll.d p.eriod, _,condition [10] implies that k)·~1 and Zl > 1 at 't l' > 0 and
ti Ii := O. With 0 k1 I fj'i >0 and fj ZI / a1j < 0 , it follows that '1* > 0 for 'p A <PB. Furthermore, it
must be that Zl (1"1·)> 0 at t I > 0 and thus also at 't; > O. Hence, using this in conditio-n £11J
implies that V;: ('t ; ) + V;: (t';) > O. Comparing this with condition [1 OJ implies thatt; <'t7. Q.E.D.2
P1iQQfgtptopQsjtiQn .~.
Theproofis'similar to the proofofproposition 3. Again wehavepartial compens~ti't}~in, ~he s¢cond
~> ~ ~_ ,'·0 > "v~ > y v, y 'yV>,' >~,,"_'f y ,".v_., :"/ y y .vv
period, becau$e with c,.(r2 ) >0 for Y2 >:0 in condition [13},. it' s~UI ~oI~~ws>,that r; > o,~ but
yt (r;~) < yf(r;). As a consequence Si~ > S~ at (1j :::: 0, '2-;t ;). ~ondi~i~~'rl0] impli~S'th~tt >~J;' > 0
·,but:g:I1b<that Si~' »Sl~} at (~~~:ri~, t'iJ~ 'iJsing'this ill :tbfiifiili&:l{tfl]'~ifednipariftg:With16i implies, Rtt~reh:e~s" ,"
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